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Abstract 
 
 
Much recent literature on slavery implicitly conceives power as zero-sum 
coercion of one rational unitary subject by another, emphasizing violence 
while failing to investigate resistance. To address this, this paper considers 
Michel Foucault, whose works challenge such understandings of power 
and the subject. Foucault distinguishes “power” (an exercised relation 
closely linked to resistance) from “violence” (a relationship without 
possibility of resistance). The paper suggests Foucault’s theories are 
indeed useful, though not unproblematic: he himself used “slavery” 
rhetorically to exemplify the difference between “violence” and “power” 
without investigating how slavery actually functioned, potentially 
replicating the resistance-masking gesture that prompted the paper’s initial 
turn to Foucault. 
 
Foucault’s theories are introduced, and a case made for the theoretical 
relevance of slavery. The paper then conducts an empirical enquiry into 
“violence”, “power” and “resistance” in antebellum slavery using the 
autobiographical narratives of Frederick Douglass. It is argued that slavery 
involved “violence” and “power”, with many forms of resistance. Power 
and violence are discussed using Foucault’s analyses of sovereignty and 
discipline, with consequences for his thesis of a shift from a regime of 
sovereignty to one of discipline. 
 
Considering Elaine Scarry and Judith Butler alongside Foucault, the paper 
then argues for understanding self-creation as a performative process of 
resistance to violence, made possible through gaps in power. This leads to 
a discussion of the narratives themselves as a form of resistance, which is 
then extended through a brief reading of Homi Bhabha’s DissemiNation to 
suggest Douglass’s narratives not only narrated his life, but can also be 
seen in performative terms as ‘narrating the nation’. The paper suggests 
certain findings may be pertinent to contemporary slavery, but highlights 
certain aspects of resistance that were historically specific. Throughout, it 
is argued that Foucault’s work is fruitful for this and further study of 
slavery. 
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Introduction 
 
 
There are 27 million slaves worldwide today—more than ever before (Bales, 
2004: 8)—yet slavery remains under-researched, and research confined to few 
perspectives. Contemporary slavery literature (for example Bales, 2000; 2004; 2005; 
2007; McGill, 2003; van den Anker, 2004; Batstone, 2007) tends to employ 
journalistic or mainstream sociological approaches (Chowdhry, 2004 is a rare—
postcolonialist—exception). Major modern slavery literature (particularly Bales, 
2004) typically approaches power either as economically derived or as pure violent 
coercion of—and by—unitary subjects who pre-exist their relations, assumptions I 
sought to question. 
 
Inspired by his influence on postcolonial studies of domination, I turned to Foucault 
for a relational view of power that emphasizes resistance, only to discover he himself 
apparently dismisses slavery as coercion, yet without his trademark historical detail. 
 
This dissertation seeks not to dismiss other theories of power, rather to explore 
Foucauldian views: what can a broadly Foucauldian understanding of power, 
violence, and resistance bring to the study of slavery? Conversely, this implies that 
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slavery can inform thinking about Foucault’s concepts, as argued in Chapter 1. 
Foucault’s vast theoretical range and methodological implications cannot be 
comprehensively addressed in a short project: I have not employed genealogical or 
archaeological methodologies, rather I have sought to explore a particular snapshot of 
slavery through specific Foucauldian concepts—power, violence, resistance—and 
vice-versa. 
 
Exploring micro-level power requires more detail on individual lives than is available 
in contemporary slave literature. Present-day slaves’ own detailed accounts are 
extremely rare (though see Cox and Marks, 2006), and their own analyses rarer. 
Ethical and practical difficulties interviewing slaves necessitated deferring 
contemporary slavery to my PhD. This dissertation therefore addresses antebellum 
slavery using older, far more detailed, primary sources. Literature on antebellum 
slavery is far more theoretically varied, though I have not encountered this exact 
enquiry in that literature either. Results cannot be easily generalised to contemporary 
slavery, which differs in respect of ownership and racism (Bales, 2004: 10-11, 24-
26), but many of these mechanisms of power depend on neither: the study 
demonstrates these theories are fruitful enough for further consideration and provides 
a previously unexplored basis for future comparison with contemporary forms of 
slavery.  
 
To understand power, Foucault suggests starting with resistance (Foucault, 
2000f: 329). This means not masking slaves’ voices, instead taking seriously their 
own unique experiences and analyses of violence, power and resistance. This, then, is 
a first foray into the theoretical issues using the well-known, detailed and reflective 
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narratives of Frederick Douglass, who escaped antebellum slavery and rose to 
political office. 
 
There are, potentially, many “Foucaults”, particularly given his own 
problematizations of authorial consistency (Foucault, 1977c; 1988: 14 cited Mills 
2003: 3; Dumm, 1996: xxi-xxiii). Foucault offers his books as “a kind of tool box 
which others can rummage through” (Foucault 1994: 523-524 quoted in O’Farrell 
2005: 50) for tools to be used, rather than to constrain (Foucault, Mills, 2003: 7; 
Prozorov, 2007: 15). Chapter 1 offers a reading of Foucault, outlines his influential 
thinking about power and resistance, and problematizes their separation from 
violence, making the case for the empirical enquiry pursued in chapter 2. Chapter 2 
utilises Douglass’s autobiographies to investigate the functioning of violence and 
power in—and resistances to—slavery. Chapter 3 further discusses resistance, 
considering narration itself as performative resistance. 
 
This dissertation suggests violence is indeed important, though it may function 
somewhat differently than pure coercion, and is crucially interlinked with power. 
Resistance, which the “coercion” view masks, proves both possible and widespread. 
Before this can be demonstrated, Chapter 1 will introduce the relevant concepts. 
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1 
 
 
Power, Violence, Resistance and “Slavery” in Foucault 
 
 
This chapter introduces key terms in Foucault’s work, outlining his conception of 
power before discussing the conceptual separation of power and violence, and his use 
of “slavery” as exemplary of that separation. I suggest the latter move is problematic, 
necessitating an empirical enquiry into how power, violence and resistance interact in 
slavery, to be pursued in the next chapter. To prepare for that enquiry, I outline 
Foucault’s analyses of sovereign and disciplinary regimes of power, before noting 
some criticisms and useful refinements of Foucault. 
 
Foucault’s understanding of “power” is set against a traditional notion of zero-sum 
coercion of one rational agent by another, which he connects with a juridical-
economic model of power-as-right, which may be exchanged, given up, moved 
around as a commodity dispersed in a top-down or centre-outward fashion (Foucault, 
1980b: 198; Foucault, 2004: 13). For Foucault, power is irreducible to law or right 
(Foucault, 1998: 89), and is neither substance (Foucault, 2000d: 324), possession, 
nor exchangeable commodity (Foucault, 1998: 94; Foucault, 2004: 14): “Power, in 
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the substantive sense, ‘le’ pouvoir, doesn’t exist.” (Foucault, 1980b: 198) Rather, 
power is relational, existing only insofar as it is exercised (Sheridan, 1980: 139; 
Foucault, 2000f: 337). It is produced in action—not directly on the other individual 
but on their conduct (Foucault, 2000d: 324; Foucault, 2000f: 340)—from moment-
to-moment and point-to-point (Foucault, 1998: 93) as part of a complex all-pervading 
web of “micro-powers” that extends horizontally as well as vertically (Sheridan, 
1980: 139). Foucault understands power as a complex network of shifting relations in 
which “[p]ower is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it 
comes from everywhere.” (Foucault, 1998: 93) Power, therefore, should not be 
analysed from a central point from which other forms derive, rather “it is the moving 
substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender 
states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable” (Foucault, 1998: 93). 
Relatively stable effects or ‘major dominations’ (Foucault, 1998: 94) may occur 
through repetitious concatenation of groups of relations: the mistake is to assume that 
these accretions of effects, even when ossified into a “state of domination” (Foucault, 
2000b: 283), are immutable causal principles rather than hegemonic effects.  
 
One implication is that there is no ontic outside to power relations (though Foucault 
may be read as suggesting an ontological exteriority—a constitutive outside—to his 
‘diagrams’ of power relations – see Prozorov, 2007: 18). Against a tradition of 
political thought enunciated within/as the desire to escape from politics (Dumm, 
1996: 1-2), this understanding of power permits no such exodus. Resistance consists 
not in the final overthrow of power, but in localised (Sheridan, 1980: 139) attempts to 
reconfigure power relations so as to minimise domination (Dumm, 1996: 141). All 
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power relations are not equally tolerable, and overthrowing institutions may be 
desirable and achievable, but it does not bring one outside power. 
 
Foucault (1980d: 119-120; 2004: 40) rejects the general equation (though not all 
specific linkages (Foucault, 1998: 12)) of power with repression: power generally 
works neither by repressing the natural or essential, nor by distorting pre-existing 
individual subjects. Rather, for Foucault power ceaselessly produces the appearance 
of the natural, constructs bodies (Butler, 1989: 601), and “produces reality, […] 
domains of objects and rituals of truth”, such that “[t]he individual and the knowledge 
that may be gained of him belong to this production.” (Foucault, 1977a: 194) Even—
indeed, especially—in perhaps its most intuitively ‘reasonable’ location—
“sexuality”—Foucault denied the ‘repressive hypothesis’. Far from repressing 
“sexuality”, the Victorian era incited it to speak ever more voluminously and 
ceaselessly in countless new discourses, producing its objects (“sex”/“sexuality”) and 
multitudinous perversions (Foucault, 1998: 48). This is among Foucault’s many 
demonstrations of how power operates through the production and promotion of both 
objects of knowledge and specific subjectivities—through specific forms of 
subjectification (here used equivalently with subjectivation, both being translations of 
Foucault’s assujettissement)—here producing a particular, confessing, subject 
(Foucault, 1998: 59). We have come to see this power-induced endless speaking 
about sex as liberation from power (Foucault, 1998: 7, 159), hence Foucault’s 
suspicion of “liberation”.  
 
The example of “sexuality” also shows the mutual imbrication of power and 
knowledge, central to power’s productivity. Against the age-old notion that power and 
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truth are separable or opposed, Foucault insists power produces knowledge, whilst 
knowledge simultaneously presupposes and constitutes power relations (Foucault, 
1977a: 27; 1980a: 59; 1980d: 131-133): power relations “can neither be established 
nor function unless a true discourse is produced, accumulated, put into circulation, 
and set to work” (Foucault, 2004: 24). “Discourse”, here, is to be understood as 
distinct from language, as a complex set of material practices and anonymous 
regularities structuring the domain of statements that count as true (Mills, 2003: 55) 
or intelligible, as well as referring to actual bodies of statements. Different discourses 
may interact, variously supporting or undermining one another, competing to redefine 
the objects they constitute, with profound political implications that do not necessarily 
favour dominance. Whilst “discourse” helps to theorise the persistence and regularity 
of power relations, it is ‘tactically polyvalent’, which is to say it may be used for 
competing ends, or combined in incompatible ways (Foucault, 1998: 100-102): in 
short, there are always immanent possibilities for resistance; power is never final, it is 
always a repetitious effect (Foucault, 1998: 93). This repetitiousness is central to 
Butler’s “performativity”, which builds on Foucault’s assertion that the subject is a 
form (Foucault, 2000b: 290), and will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
Briefly, power manifests locally not because it trickles down, but because local 
manifestations are the repeated performance of power. For example, the distinction—
and, hence relations—between masters and slaves appears at state/society level, in 
law, itself supporting the local relations, but it is exercised in/through local level 
performances. That power must be performed implies possibilities for unconscious 
failure to perform roles, and for conscious resistances that build on the knowledge 
that it is locally vulnerable, important in chapter 2. 
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This production of subjects is so indissociable from power that Foucault claims his 
work is not principally a theory of power, but “a history of the different modes by 
which […] human beings are made subjects” (Foucault, 2000f: 326-327). In 
overlapping phases he studied ‘scientific’ modes whereby “man” among other objects 
becomes knowable (Foucault, 2002a; 2002b), practices dividing the subject within 
himself or from others (Foucault, 1977a; 2001), and “the way a human turns him- or 
herself into a subject” (for example Foucault, 1998; 2000b, though aspects of 
discipline may be similarly understood). 
 
“Slavery” and the Separation of Power and Violence 
 
Before discussing specific regimes of power, it is necessary to clarify Foucault’s 
terminological distinction between “power” and “violence”, and the relevance of 
“slavery”.  
 
The potential for resistance is the sine qua non of power for Foucault: “where there is 
power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1998: 95). Without resistance, there is a 
‘relationship of violence’. Foucault persistently uses “slavery” as, depending how one 
reads him, either his example of a ‘relationship of violence’ or as a point where 
“power” and “violence” segue into one another. 
 
Foucault states, “Where the determining factors are exhaustive, there is no 
relationship of power: slavery is not a power relationship when a man is in chains, 
only when he has some possible mobility, even a chance of escape.” (Foucault, 
2000f: 342). The qualification here may be read strictly as implying that some slavery 
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is a power relation (i.e. when a body is not in chains but still enslaved). However, 
Foucault never supplied any details of “slavery”—one can read “in chains” as a 
metaphorical and rhetorical substitute for such detail—and elsewhere he more 
explicitly characterized slavery as violence (1977a: 137), differentiating “discipline” 
from the “costly and violent relation” of slavery based on the appropriation of bodies. 
 
Slaves’ positions are deeply polarised and their bodies are appropriated, however they 
may often not be literally chained or absolutely determined and appropriation must be 
maintained; as such there are possibilities of, and hopes for mobility and escape. Such 
moments of absolutely determining violence may well be a necessary feature of 
slavery but I want to explore whether they are sufficient. Foucault (2000f: 340) notes 
“power” and “violence” may coexist—they are not mutually exclusive—however, the 
analytical separation itself raises the logical and empirical questions of how they 
interact. The use of slavery as an example may be fruitful if studied in detail, however 
when glossed over briefly or used metaphorically or rhetorically it may have 
unfortunate effects: Mills (2003: 40), quoting this same section from Foucault, takes 
it to show “the relationship between those in struggles over power is not simply 
reducible to a master-slave relation” (my emphasis). Here, therefore, “master-slave 
relation” implies pure violence without resistance, a characterization I dispute in 
Chapter 2. Mills cautions that in theorising the interlinkage of resistance and power, 
one should not reduce or hide the agency of those who do resist (2003: 40), yet using 
“slavery” in this fashion has precisely that effect. The point is not to castigate Mills 
(who then, contradictorily, briefly discusses slave resistance (Mills, 2003: 41) but to 
highlight Foucault’s problematic formulation. 
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Another interview offers implicit clarification: “power relations are possible only 
insofar as the subjects are free. If one of them were completely at the other’s disposal 
and became his thing, an object on which he could wreak boundless and limitless 
violence, there wouldn’t be any relations of power. Even […] when it can truly be 
claimed that one side has “total power” over the other, a power can be exercised over 
the other only insofar as the other still has the option of killing himself, of leaping out 
the window, or of killing the other person […] if there were no possibility of 
resistance (of violent resistance, flight, deception, strategies capable of reversing the 
situation), there would be no power relations at all.” (Foucault, 2000b: 292) This 
statement clarifies the identification of “power relations”, however resistance is so 
widely conceived that we must wonder what might qualify as a “relation of 
violence”? Though unnamed, slavery again functions implicitly as the example – a 
relation in which one is another’s ‘thing’. However, did masters exercise “boundless 
and limitless violence”? If so, this would seem to be “a relationship of violence” in 
Foucault’s terms. Otherwise, we must—as chapter 2 argues—allow that slavery 
consists, at least in part, of power relations. 
 
What about the requirement that “subjects are free”? On the face of it, little could be 
more obvious than that a slave is not ‘free’, but (without disputing slavery’s horrors) 
in Foucault’s sense they are not entirely unfree. Theorising ‘Foucauldian’ freedom is, 
unfortunately, a dissertation in itself. Here it must suffice to define the freedom that is 
the condition of power minimally as “a field of possibilities in which several kinds of 
conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behaviour are available” (Foucault, 
2000f: 342 quoted in Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2005: 5). As such, it is distinct from 
liberation, and from ‘concrete freedom’ (see Dumm, 1996; Prozorov, 2007). 
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In the same interview Foucault introduces a further terminological gradation: states of 
domination “in which the power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing the 
various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen.” 
(Foucault, 2000b: 283) Chapter 2 considers slavery as a “state of domination”, 
effectively a productive borderline case between relatively fixed “power” and 
“violence”.  
 
Although power is, by definition, ever shifting, Foucault identifies regimes of 
historically characteristic modalities of power, though these are neither mutually 
exclusive nor radically separable (Foucault, 2000c: 219). While he is famous for his 
later works on the regime of “governmentality” and biopower/biopolitics, these 
presuppose greater freedoms and are less helpful here, therefore I focus on his earlier 
analyses of regimes of “sovereignty” and “discipline”.  
 
Sovereignty 
 
“Sovereignty” has multiple meanings, related through the figure of the sovereign. It 
may refer to the classical conception of sovereignty described in Foucault 
(1998: 135-159) as the right (and practice) of the sovereign to kill with impunity or let 
live, distinct from ‘biopower’, which actively fosters or ‘disallows’ life (Foucault, 
1998: 138; Dean, 1999: 139). Secondly, sovereignty may refer in Schmittian terms to 
the exception, the right (more accurately the unfounded/unfoundable decisionistic 
practice) of founding law or deciding exception to it (Prozorov, 2007: 87). Thirdly it 
may refer to the modality of power relations typical to the regime of sovereignty. 
Though all three have some relevance to slaves, here I focus on Foucault’s analysis of 
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punishment in regimes of sovereignty. He focuses on public execution, as part of a 
range of punishments based on public pain, analysed in terms of a political 
technology of the body that subsequently changes with the inception of disciplinary 
society. The characteristic functioning and failures of the exercise of sovereign power 
through spectacle, and its implications for resistance, as analysed in Foucault 
(1977a: 3-69) can, as Chapter 2 will show, serve as a model for certain aspects of 
master-slave power relations. 
 
The exercise of sovereign power is discontinuous and episodic (Foucault, 1977a: 88, 
130; Foucault, 1980d: 119). Its display must be spectacular: severity of punishment 
must deter crime, whereas discipline relies on certainty of punishment (Foucault, 
1977a: 9). In this sense, the ‘expenditure’ of sovereign power is ‘costly’—it must be 
excessive and extreme—hence the inventive tortures accompanying execution. 
Torture also functioned to produce and arithmetically guarantee truth (Foucault, 
1977a: 35-39). This is not the point at which power goes out-of-control, it is central 
to power’s normal functioning: “torture is a technique; it is not an extreme expression 
of lawless rage” (Foucault, 1977a: 33). It functions in a detailed and calculated 
economy of pain, in which the body of the condemned functions as a sign to the 
populace: it was “a policy of terror: to make everyone aware, through the body of the 
criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign. The public execution did not 
re-establish justice; it reactivated power.” (Foucault, 1977a: 49, my emphasis). 
 
Whilst this is a relationship of violence between sovereign and victim, that 
relationship of violence is an element in a relation of power between sovereign and 
populace. As a relation of power, there is the potential for resistance, for failure of the 
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exercise. The role of the crowd is “internal to the public execution itself: at once an 
element of its functioning and the principle of its perpetual disorder.” (Foucault, 
1977a: 57). The crowd must witness, must see for itself in order to feel the necessary 
fear, but the risk is that it may revolt (Foucault, 1977a: 58-59, 73). Revolt may be 
anything from feeling sympathy for the criminal or becoming accustomed to the 
violence from which they are supposed to be deterred, to failing to play (or 
exceeding) their role at the pillory, to all-out rebellion to free the criminal and attack 
the executioner (Foucault, 1977a: 59-63). The moment sovereign power determines 
to display itself fully becomes the very moment when it reaches its limits and proves 
its own vulnerability. The crowd’s function is to render itself governable, to take up 
and ‘cite’ the sovereign’s power, but this very scenario produces the opportunity and 
reveals the possibility for it to refuse/fail.  
 
Discipline 
 
The regime of “discipline” eschews sovereignty’s spectacular, episodic but unreliable 
displays of power in favour of a meticulous, calculated, continually functioning, 
subtle and economical regime of micro-coercions that seek to encompass everything 
and become so internalised as to become self-disciplining-self (Foucault, 1977a: 202-
203). The word “internalised” here should not be taken to imply a radical internality 
of a pre-existing subject, rather it conveys something of the process by which a 
particular kind of individual subject becomes possible in the disciplinary regime, and 
the production of that subject and delimitation of its ‘internal’ domain is at once an 
operation of power. Whereas in sovereignty the body-in-pain as sign was crucial, in 
discipline the body is that which is to be trained, rendered in a relation of docility-
 14 
utility (Foucault, 1977a: 137). In punishment, the body is that which must be gotten 
beyond for a higher purpose (Foucault, 1977a: 11): the ‘internal’ soul becomes a 
principle of intelligibility, thus becoming the object of regulation that is not the body 
but is inscribed upon it, hence “the soul is the prison of the body” (Foucault, 
1977a: 29-30; Butler, 1989: 606).  
 
It is principally the mechanics of discipline that interest me here. The exemplary 
figure of discipline is the architectural device of Bentham’s panopticon (Foucault, 
1977a: 200), which functions through the disciplinary gaze by means of surveillance 
(‘discipline’ being the chosen English translation of surveiller). The panopticon 
functions by placing bodies into a space that is ordered and ostensibly perfectly 
surveilled: a circular building with cells lit by outside light renders each ‘inmate’ 
visible to the occupant of a permanently visible central observation tower whose 
occupancy is rendered unverifiable by the architecture. Simultaneously, inmates are 
effectively separated from, and prevented from communicating freely with, one 
another. Any misdemeanour may be observed and punished. Crucially the inmates 
have no way of knowing whether or not they actually are being watched; they are 
incited to ‘watch’ themselves at all times (Foucault, 1977a: 201). This insidious 
operation is backed by the potential for violence but its genius is in rendering that 
violence unnecessary: it is, in itself, a power relation that requires and enlists the 
individual in his/her own subjection. In principle it may fail/be resisted, though it is 
designed to minimise that likelihood: “to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and 
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange 
things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its 
action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise 
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unnecessary […] the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they 
are themselves the bearers.” (Foucault, 1977a: 201, my emphases) The panopticon 
also constitutes the figure at its centre: they are not the pre-existing source or 
principle of power, rather they too are an effect (Foucault, 1980c: 157-159). 
 
Foucault’s thesis is that the West (including nineteenth-century U.S.A. (Foucault, 
1977a: 15)) has, through a variety of discursive and epistemological shifts and in 
response to the problems of punishment in the regime of sovereignty, moved 
increasingly toward a disciplinary regime (Foucault, 1977a; 1980d: 119). This marks 
not humanization of punishment but a shift in the political anatomy of the body – 
bodies are ‘broken down’ into constituent parts and rearranged according to new 
political functioning (Foucault, 1977a: 138-139). Panopticism functions alongside an 
explosion of dressage techniques for coercing and training the body through 
microscopically observed exercises. The habitual demeanour of the body, its 
positions, its aptitudes, desires and so on must all be regulated to produce “docile 
bodies” whose aptitudes are to be maximised but tamed (Foucault, 1977a: 138). 
Construction of bodies does not deny the materiality of the body, but suggests there is 
no moment at which the body is not always-already political, always-already inserted 
into power relations, knowable – and its extra-discursive materiality ironically only 
delimitable – through discourse (Butler, 1989: 601; 1993: 10-11). Though 
“discipline” may have conscious programmers (such as prison reformers), power for 
Foucault is intentional and non-subjective, preceding any given subject and exceeding 
programmatic intentions (Foucault, 1998: 94-95; Dean, 1999: 22, 72), and exerting 
regular pressures and effects. For example, gender may be considered a dispersed 
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disciplinary regime in which “the disciplinarian is everyone and yet no one in 
particular.” (Bartky, 1988: 70 quoted in Mills, 2003: 94). 
 
Criticisms and Refinements of Foucault 
 
Foucault has been accused of rendering substantive resistance impossible or 
unthinkable (Phillips, 2002: 330) through his insistence on construction, denial of an 
‘outside’ to power relations, and simultaneous insistence that resistance is always part 
of power relations. However, that resistance is ‘part of’ a power relation does not 
imply subservience to power. Foucault in fact suggests resistance is both more 
frequent and more possible than we often imagine (Mills, 2003: 40). As we have 
seen, Foucault is sceptical of projects of liberation, suggesting these have too often 
perversely intensified power’s hold on us (Dumm, 1996: 2). However he affirms that 
liberation struggles not only “have their place” but may be a necessary condition for 
the “practices of freedom” he increasingly studied, however they are insufficient in 
themselves (Foucault, 2000b: 282-283). “Liberation” may be considered like 
“solutions” in general: not ‘bad’ but ‘dangerous’ such that “we always have 
something to do” (Foucault, 2000e: 256). It is always liberation from a particular set 
of power relations, violence or state of domination and to another set of power 
relations. Major shifts in domination are rare, but not impossible, and Foucault’s 
point is that everything is not fixed in the meantime: we are not doomed to passivity 
(Mills, 2003: 40). Changeability is built into the very idea that power is not a 
substance, but a process; moreover, while there is no outside to power relations 
Foucault’s genealogical and archaeological methods are concerned with uncovering 
the contingencies of (hence challenging) our present position (Dumm, 1996: 22). 
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Others criticise Foucault’s non-interpretive stance (Mills, 2003: 41) and normative 
reluctance, though those who demand normative prescription perhaps fail to 
appreciate its perpetual dangers (Prozorov, 2007: 12). Reticence about grand 
prescription is consistent with Foucault’s identification of “the indignity of speaking 
for others” (Foucault and Deleuze, 1977: 209) and position on ‘specific intellectuals’ 
(Foucault, 1980d: 128-130). Nonetheless, Foucault’s own activism and his choice of 
objects of study should undermine accusations of quietism (Mills, 2003: 41), as might 
the prolific anti-conservative use of his works in postcolonialism and feminism, in 
spite of his (or his works’) androcentrism (McNay, 1992: 195; Mills, 2003: 7) and 
eurocentrism (Said, 1994: 47). 
 
Decentering subjects perhaps risks disqualifying the subject at the very moment 
previously-excluded groups seek to mobilise it against dominant subjects (Hartsock, 
1987: 160 cited in Loomba, 2005: 206), however many Foucauldian positions 
suggest not the abandonment or destitution of the subject (though see Prozorov, 2007) 
but its interrogation. Butler, for example, produces a theory building upon Foucault’s 
understanding of power, demonstrating how the effect of the subject appears, how it is 
significant, not that it is insignificant, suggesting a revised notion of agency discussed 
in chapter 3.  
 
Scott (1990) broadly accepts Foucault’s ideas but suggests that the analysis of power 
relations is impaired by failure to emphasize that each ‘side’ has roles (Scott, 
1990: xii), such that observed relations are only part of the picture. Observed 
performances of power and resistance may be tactics, thus Scott introduces the notion 
of ‘hidden transcripts’—used in chapter 2—i.e. those actions, opinions, and utterances 
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which cannot be spoken to the other party but which may be avowed in the presence 
of coequals, which occasionally irrupt into ‘public’ view. 
 
Chapter 2 argues the thesis of a shift from sovereign power to discipline is 
problematic with regard to slavery, and that panoptic surveillance may support an 
otherwise sovereign regime, decoupled from other aspects of discipline. Power and 
violence coexist, but their analytical separation, and the refinements introduced above 
elucidate their function and the possibilities for resistance. 
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2 
 
 
Power, Violence and Resistance in the Narratives of 
Frederick Douglass 
 
 
This chapter considers Frederick Douglass’s experiences of slavery in light of 
theoretical and empirical concerns outlined in Chapter 1, seeking to understand the 
interaction of power and violence, and outline possibilities for resistance with 
reference to Douglass’s autobiographies, which at 1292 pages provide unusually 
detailed and analytical first-hand accounts of slavery. 
 
Frederick Douglass was born c.1818 in Tuckahoe, Maryland. Aged 8, his master gave 
him to relatives in Baltimore, a less violent environment than the plantation. Here, 
through various ruses, he learned to read and write. Returned to Tuckahoe in 1832, his 
master thought him “spoiled” and him sent to Covey—the negro-breaker—for one 
year. Six months in, considering himself ‘broken’ and fit only for slavery he 
unexpectedly and successfully fought Covey, fortunately escaping punishment for this 
capital offense – a turning point in his fortunes. After periods with kinder masters, he 
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was caught prior to attempting escape. With the case unproven, amidst murderous 
sentiment from other slaveholders, his master returned him to Baltimore where he 
further progressed in literacy and faith before successfully escaping Northward in 
1838, becoming a leading abolitionist from 1841. Among the most prominent black 
US statesmen, he died in 1895. (Douglass, 1893; 1969; 1995)  
 
Given limited space, this does not claim to be comprehensive or fully 
representative—it is an exploration of one case—however, while the focus is on 
Douglass my research has in fact been broader. Many of the key points raised are far 
from unique. Sovereign killing and torture feature widely in slave accounts (e.g. 
Bruner, 1845: 42; Jacobs, 1853; Jackson, 1862: 23), as do surveillance (see Parenti, 
2003: 13-32), contested interpretations of Christianity (Brown, 1849: 136; 1880: 15-
16), and everyday forms of resistance such as mockery, singing and ‘hidden 
transcripts’ (Scott, 1990: 4, 139). 
 
The chapter considers Foucault’s models of “sovereign power” and “discipline”, 
suggesting the former is broadly useful, while surveillance may be decoupled from 
Foucault’s broader thesis on “discipline”. Next, it outlines some key forms of slave 
resistance. Finally, it discusses Foucault’s distinction between “violence” and 
“power”, suggesting that in this state of domination violence does play a fundamental 
role (more complex than pure coercion), however there are indeed power relations 
and resistance (though the difficulty of resistance should not be underestimated). 
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“Sovereignty”: the Duality of Violence and Power 
 
This section considers Foucault’s analysis (1977a: 32-69) of the spectacle and 
witnesses under the regime of sovereignty (outlined in chapter 1). I suggest the 
principal relationship of master and slaves is one of ‘micro-sovereignty’, i.e. a 
localised de facto sovereignty in which killing functions analogously to Foucault’s 
account, while torture functions similarly, but additionally desubjectifies. I argue 
these are both ‘violence’ and ‘power’, depending on target. I do not attempt to locate 
the slaveholder within the history of classical sovereignty, rather I contend that as a 
modality of power relations this forms a useful model: we can think of the slaveholder 
as a ‘micro-sovereign’ in this limited sense. 
 
Murder 
Murder of slaves by white slaveholders is a recurrent actuality and ever-present 
possibility in Douglass’s account. A slave named Demby broke free while being 
whipped for some minor infraction, ran into the creak and stood silently refusing to 
come out. For his defiance the overseer shot him in the head in front of an audience of 
terrified slaves (Douglass, 1893: 76-78; 1969: 122-123; 1995: 13-15). Since this was 
a crime to neither courts nor white community and slaves’ grievances and testimonies 
were inadmissible (Douglass, 1969: 124, 316-317, 449; 1995: 14), the only 
repercussion was an enquiry from Demby’s owner as to the reason. The reply given is 
telling: “Demby had become unmanageable. He was setting a dangerous example to 
the other slaves, —one which, if suffered to pass without some such demonstration on 
his part, would finally lead to the total subversion of all rule and order upon the 
plantation.” (Douglass, 1995: 14, my emphasis) Soon afterward, a neighbouring 
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slaveholder shot another slave for straying (starving and seeking oysters) onto his 
stretch of river (Douglass, 1893: 81; 1969: 123-7; 1995: 15). Though he survived, 
there was “very little said about it at all, and nothing done” nor would there have been 
had he died (Douglass, 1995: 15). Douglass mentions numerous other murders either 
for failure or—typically—resistance (Douglass, 1893: 78-81; 1969: 127; 1995: 15). 
No perpetrator faced any justice or stigmatization, and slaves had no redress save 
violent resistance (absent in these cases): these acts and their perpetrators were 
effectively sovereign with respect to the slave population, incurring only the prospect 
of explaining to other whites. Lest these instances be thought aberrant, or mere 
excuses for the violent proclivities of particular individuals, this practice appears 
regularly in slave narratives as noted above. The explanation’s accuracy is less 
important than that it functions reliably as an effective explanation – part of the 
circulating “true” discourse about master/slave relations, an authorised, intelligible 
and acceptable statement. As such it is revealing of the strategic logic of the state of 
domination and its associated discourses. 
 
Between sovereign perpetrator and victim, murder is clearly a relationship of violence 
that terminates power along with resistance. However, its primary useful function is 
not killing the slave—an economic loss—but that in terrorising the others it 
‘reactivates’ a power relation between sovereign and spectators, reproducing the 
‘unrestrained presence’ (Foucault, 1977a: 49) of the master-as-sovereign, and 
instating the plantation as an exceptional space under the sovereign’s self-founded 
law. This is, strictly speaking, a power relation as it requires the response and self-
modification of the audience and can in principle—at great risk—be resisted or 
responded to in different ways. 
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Torture 
This duality as both violence (to the one) and power (to the many) may be clearer 
with respect to examples of non-fatal torture, which Scarry (1985: 27 cited in Bakare-
Yusuf, 1999: 318) describes as ‘mock execution’. 
 
Whippings occur with overwhelming frequency in Douglass’s narratives (e.g. 
Douglass, 1893: 55, 64, 70, 137, 139, 148; 1969: 149, 201, 203, 214, 262, 277; 
1995: 4-5, 10-12, 21, 27-28, 33-36, 41, 43-45, 47). No master is mentioned who does 
not flog, and the most resistant slaves are sent to Covey, the brutal ‘negro-breaker’. 
For Douglass, whipping is essential to slavery – the sole motivation for work 
(Douglass, 1969: 216). He suggests elsewhere that rewards are also relevant—though 
still supplemental to whipping—including ‘privileged’ positions on the master’s sloop 
(Douglass, 1995: 5), the relative freedom of certain journeys (Douglass, 1893: 60-
61), and domestic positions at the ‘Great House’ (a ‘slave aristocracy’ (Douglass, 
1969: 109)). 
The Nietzschean idea of a ‘mnemonics of pain’ underlying Foucault’s Discipline and 
Punish concerns the construction—the ‘paining into existence’—of a capable subject 
(specifically one capable of promising (Dumm, 1996: 75-77)). In contrast, Scarry 
(1985) argues that in torture, pain destroys language through its non-referentiality, 
serving to deconstruct the world of the subject, indeed to desubjectify (Bakare-Yusuf, 
1999: 317). The body-in-pain is a body excluded from participation in civic life – a 
body torn from language whose subject is reduced to flesh – unmade with his or her 
world (Bakare-Yusuf, 1999: 315). This is violence in Foucault’s sense—destroying 
the subject that might resist (producing a rupture in processes of subjectification 
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(power))—yet it also writes on the “living parchment” (Douglass, 1969: 177) of the 
body a permanent mark – a sign in a power relation with others.  
If we were to assume a ‘rational’ unitary subject we might expect the greatest 
prevalence of thoughts of escape to correlate with the worst times, whereas Douglass 
claims the exact opposite—that it was at times of greatest violence, deprivation and 
suffering that he and others were least able to resist or conceive escape (Douglass, 
1969: 263). Understanding pain as desubjectifying and world-destroying helps us 
make sense of this otherwise perhaps confusing finding: as I argue later, self-
creation—possible through gaps in violence and power—was central to Douglass’s 
resistance, and it is precisely this that extreme pain destroys or delays. 
 
Though lacking pain’s non-referentiality and concomitant language-destroying 
capacity (Bakare-Yusuf, 1999: 314), it appears widespread sleep deprivation and 
starvation (Douglass, 1893: 62-63; 1969: 188, 197; 1995: 6, 16, 31) may have 
supported desubjectification by weakening and reducing slaves to bodily need, 
rendering them unable to conceive of major resistance – certainly Douglass counts 
hunger alongside torture in reducing his ability to imagine escape: “Beat and cuff 
your slave, keep him hungry and spiritless, and he will follow the chain of his master 
like a dog; but, feed and clothe him well,—work him moderately—surround him with 
physical comfort,—and dreams of freedom intrude. Give him a bad master, and he 
aspires to a good master; give him a good master, and he wishes to become his own 
master.” (Douglass, 1969: 263) 
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While Foucault does not tell us much about this aspect of violence, his analysis of 
sovereignty suggests torture is simultaneously an element in a power relation with 
other slaves who witness it, which is vulnerable to resistance from slaves. At times, 
when the slave is hired out to another plantation, it is also affected by relations among 
masters and overseers. It is also, especially when slaves are hired to other plantations, 
situated in a wider web of power relations among masters and among slaves, though 
the near-sovereign recourse to murder in response to all-out resistance remained a 
permanent threat. Everyday whippings were both certain and severe, and did not 
necessarily concern any immediate conduct of the slave in question – indeed it was 
near-impossible for a slave not to ‘deserve’ whipping thanks to an astonishingly long 
list of “justifications” (Douglass, 1969: 260-261) and because any argument 
immediately proved his/her ‘impudence’ (Douglass, 1893: 161; 1969: 230). Flogging 
was often carried out without “any expectation that the slave whipped will be 
improved by it” but “with a view to its effect upon others” (Douglass, 1969: 262): 
thus, torture partakes of the same ‘sovereign’/power-reactivating logic as execution, 
functioning as exemplary spectacle to others. Douglass believed Covey’s whipping of 
him was increased by his inability to whip another slave, Bill, whose owner was 
richer than the poor farm-renter Covey (Douglass, 1969: 262) and forbad whipping 
his slaves except for criminal acts. For his part, Bill knew and used that fact, which 
became crucial at a critical moment of resistance for Douglass (below). 
 
“Discipline” 
 
The risk of failure (i.e. resistance) is a problem for episodic, spectacular sovereign 
power, which also leaves spaces unreached by the sovereign in which illegalities and 
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‘hidden transcripts’ may flourish, such as the clandestine slave economy “carried on 
with virtual impunity” (Parenti, 2003: 16). Discipline responds with subtler, 
continuous and further-reaching power mechanisms. 
 
As might be expected, since it is defined against slavery (Foucault, 1977a: 137, many 
aspects of discipline—for example, augmenting the body’s capabilities, self-
regulation and segmentation of time, meticulous measuring and ranking—appear of 
little use in understanding Douglass’s account. While Foucault’s thesis concerns the 
genealogy of a generalized “legislative and penalizing will” (Lingis, 1999: 289) 
attaching to and producing new objects in response to shifting needs, I am interested 
primarily in his analysis of the technology of the panopticon. 
 
The panopticon (see chapter 1) exercises power through individuals themselves. 
Although the threat of violence underlies its coercive potential, it functions by 
rendering that violence unnecessary: the individual “subjected to a field of visibility 
and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them 
play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which 
he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection” 
(Foucault, 1977a: 202-203, my emphasis). Sporadic, potential violence becomes, 
through the individual, the exercise of continuous, actualised power. 
 
There is no literal panopticon on the plantation, but disciplinary self-regulation in 
response to surveillance (enabled by the positioning of the slaves and the unverifiable 
presence of a concealed observer) remains pertinent.  
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Covey—the “negro-breaker”—employed not only violence but also disciplinary 
power. He routinely, secretly surveilled his slaves – hiding, creeping around, 
pointedly riding away on horseback then sneaking back on foot. The slaves rarely 
knew if they were being watched or not (Douglass, 1969: 215-216; 1995: 36-37) thus 
learnt to behave as if they were: “There was no deceiving him. His work went on in 
his absence almost as well as in his presence; and he had the faculty of making us feel 
that he was ever present with us […] it was never safe to stop a single minute.” 
(Douglass, 1995: 36, my emphasis) Audibility functioned similarly to visibility: 
masters required slaves to sing to show they were working and not plotting or idling 
(Douglass, 1893: 61). 
 
Broader disciplinary effects (of unknown or unverifiable watchers) emerged from 
Douglass’s owner—Colonel Lloyd—owning so many slaves on out-farms that many 
did not recognise him, nor he them (Douglass, 1969: 116; 1995: 11). A story well 
known amongst the slaves was that Colonel Lloyd encountered a slave (whose skin 
would mark him as such in advance) of whom he inquired to whom he belonged and 
whether he was worked too hard. The slave answered that he belonged to Colonel 
Lloyd and was indeed overworked, “not dreaming he had been conversing with his 
master” (Douglass, 1969: 117; 1995: 11). Weeks later, without warning or being 
permitted to even say goodbye to his family, he was chained and sold to Georgia 
traders (Douglass, 1995: 11), a dreaded fate (Douglass, 1969: 301). It is unsurprising 
then that slaves “when inquired of […] almost universally say they are contented, and 
that their masters are kind” (Douglass, 1995: 11) – simultaneously feeding the myth 
of happy slaves that deflected Northern critical attention (Douglass, 1995: 9) and 
helping restrict ‘hidden transcripts’ to slaves within the plantation. While in 
 28 
Bentham’s panopticon the individual was “the object of information, never a subject 
in communication” (Dumm, 1996: 105), here it is the moment the slave is 
temporarily a speaking subject (though still an object and property, conditioning the 
risk) that is the moment of surveillance. In a cruel irony, it is the very moment the 
slave might speak out that is turned against the slave and becomes the moment s/he 
must speak in favour of his/her condition – and Douglass considered his answers 
truthful, as there were worse masters (Douglass, 1995: 12). 
 
Douglass notes examples of spies being sent among slaves, and that slaves from 
different plantations would fight claiming their master was best (Douglass, 
1969: 118; 1995: 12). Even in the relatively free (compared to the plantation) 
environment of Baltimore, upon encountering two Irishmen who advised him to 
escape to the North, Douglass feigned disinterest, fearing they might seek to catch and 
return him to his master for a reward (Douglass, 1893: 113; 1969: 170; 1995: 25). 
Describing planning his first, unsuccessful, escape attempt Douglass recounts the 
slaves’ perception that there was “at every gate […] a watchman—at every ferry a 
guard—on every bridge a sentinel—and in every wood a patrol” (Douglass, 1995: 50) 
– a powerful imagined geography of swamps, wild beasts and human treachery that 
served to discipline slaves. The reality of the patrols is not disputed, but the 
productive effect is that however few or many spies or patrols there were, the 
perception served to discipline performance and discourage escape. It was, 
however—as power—resistible: governors, patrols (often themselves illiterate hence 
unable to read the passes they demanded) and slaves engaged in a prolonged battle of 
subversions and responses, with passes written, patrols fooled, ordinances passed to 
make the passes harder to forge and include specific identifying physical 
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characteristics (Parenti, 2003: 13-32) to which slaves responded by using papers of 
freemen with suitable likeness – a subversion of discipline central to Douglass’s 
successful escape (Douglass, 1893: 245-246). 
 
I do not mean to imply that the metaphorical panopticon described above is 
necessarily a deliberate design, nor is there any need to, given Foucault’s assertion of 
power’s non-subjective intentionality (Foucault, 1998: 94-95), though the system of 
passes was quite deliberate, as were Covey’s practices. Disciplinary surveillance 
contributed to the production of each plantation as a delimited space in which 
masters’ actions were thus protected from outside scrutiny, hence this disciplinary 
effect is neither contrary to or displaces sovereign power, rather it helps produce the 
effective micro-sovereignty of the slaveholders. 
 
Though the panopticon has proven useful, the non-applicability of the rest of 
Foucault’s thesis should not be ignored. While Foucault defined discipline against 
slavery (albeit without detailing “slavery” – see chapter 1), his thesis of the 
generalized shift from sovereignty to discipline (apparently including the USA in 
Douglass’s time (Foucault, 1977a: 15)) appears somewhat inaccurate for its millions 
of slaves, who were subject to violence and sovereign modalities of power, coupled to 
certain selected disciplinary technologies. While we may consider this a slip of 
insufficient detail, interrogating the interaction of discipline, sovereign power and 
violence may have greater significance. Foucault did not claim the total replacement 
of sovereignty by discipline (Foucault, 2000c: 219), implying attention to 
sovereignty’s reinscription in the regime of discipline? Here, however, it appears 
more appropriate to speak of discipline in a regime of sovereignty. It is striking that 
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other aspects of discipline, those of training, exercises, education, the responsibility of 
the self, ranking of individuals, and the examination were actively denied the slaves. 
Escape to a disciplinary space of ‘free work’ constituted a liberation for Douglass, 
and the embrace of discipline in extreme circumstances may constitute resistance to 
desubjectification, as in Levi’s discussion of Auschwitz, where self-discipline was a 
form of resistance against dehumanization and beginning-to-die – the death-of-self 
preliminary to literal bodily death (Levi, 1960: 41 cited in Dumm, 1996: 146). 
 
Excluding plantation spaces from a broader disciplinary society may perform a 
productive or constitutive function with respect to that disciplinary society. One 
possibility would be to consider these sovereign spaces as “heterotopias of deviation” 
(though Foucault refers to abnormal behaviours (Foucault, 2000a: 180), not 
attributes). Space precludes discussing all six principles of heterotopias (see Foucault, 
2000a). The key point, and sixth principle, is that heterotopias are “other spaces” that 
“have a function in relation to the remaining space” (Foucault, 2000a: 184). Dumm 
argues “heterotopias of deviance” constitute the space underlying liberal “negative 
freedom”, ostensibly universal neutrality being established as a norm by excluding 
various abnormals (Dumm, 1996: 55) – precisely the operation necessary for slavery 
to coexist with the “land of the free”. Considering slavery as a heterotopia may 
therefore have provocative consequences for notions of “freedom”. Neither 
hypothesis can be adequately addressed with the evidence and space available, but 
further exploration would be interesting, perhaps adding to the significance of the 
resistances outlined below. 
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Resistances 
 
Refusal, Physical Resistance and Escape 
The most immediately obvious forms of resistance are perhaps escape, refusal and 
physical resistance. Escape is possible precisely because of the territorial limits on 
slaveholders’ de facto sovereignty though I have suggested various disciplinary 
effects helped reduce the perceived likelihood of success. Additionally, the Fugitive 
Slave Act (1850) extended this reach de jure to the Northern States. Rather than 
dwelling on escape, I address physical resistance and refusal, and then other 
resistances, which may have contributed to the possibility of escape. 
 
Whilst the relative fixity and overwhelming imbalances of master/slave relations—
including the threat of death—discouraged resistance, encounters are always 
vulnerable to the possibility that the slave will resist physically, hiding or fighting 
back. 
 
A turning point in Douglass’s story came after six months with Covey. After an 
especially brutal beating, Douglass hid in woods before unsuccessfully seeking his 
owner’s intervention. Seeing no alternative, he returned and was attacked by Covey, 
but on this occasion resisted blow for blow. Temporarily unarmed, Covey was 
reduced to calling for help from other slaves in order to master Douglass. This was 
resistible—and indeed resisted—albeit at personal risk: Bill, knowing he was 
protected (see earlier), feigned ignorance of Covey’s requirements, declared he had 
been ordered to work for Covey, not to help him whip Douglass, and walked off 
(Douglass, 1893: 175-176; 1995: 43). Covey’s own slave Caroline showed marked 
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courage (for she had no such protection and was herself beaten) in similarly refusing 
(Douglass, 1893: 176). While violent the power relation through Douglass’s body-as-
sign between Covey and the other slaves was resistible – exemplary whippings of 
Douglass evidently failed to achieve the desired response, instead invoking sympathy 
and solidarity. 
 
The significance for Douglass was immense: he experienced this as a “resurrection 
from the dark and pestiferous tomb of slavery, to the heaven of comparative 
freedom”, and having become unafraid to die, he felt “a freeman in fact” if not, yet, in 
form (Douglass, 1969: 247). In convincing masters that s/he cannot be whipped—
only shot—the slave succeeds in partly reversing the power relations and presenting 
the master with an all-or-nothing choice (Scott, 1990: 208). This might initially seem 
a very modest victory – despite thwarting Covey’s intention to whip him Douglass 
goes on working – it did not immediately herald his liberation. Yet it enables him to 
feel freer, to posit himself undeniably as a man, to value himself and believe in his 
future freedom, as well as significantly improving his day-to-day treatment, and his 
standing among other slaves (Douglass, 1893: 180). It changes—indeed marks—
Douglass as an individual, and constitutes a physical and psychic barrier to his further 
violent desubjectification: his life as subject begins again, he believes indomitably. 
Had Covey reported this incident Douglass would almost certainly have hanged 
(Douglass, 1969: 248), or at best been sold to the South. Douglass attributes his good 
fortune to the web of power relations in which Covey is embedded. His carefully 
guarded reputation as negro-breaker was his source of status and labour, and to this 
Douglass attributes Covey’s silence (Douglass, 1893: 178; 1969: 248; 1995: 43-44) 
and hence his own survival. 
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Failed Performances and Spaces of Resistance 
Chapter 1 outlined Foucault’s insistence that power exists only insofar as it is 
exercised, and that power relations operate through producing particular 
subjectivities, both of dominant and dominated. Butler’s theorisation of 
performativity highlights the importance of performances that do not match up to the 
norm (regardless of conscious intent). This suggests that gaps, failures, or more 
accurately different re-iteration of performance may produce a space in which 
resistance becomes more possible than might otherwise be the case. Douglass gains a 
precious glimpse of slavery’s logic, and hence space for resistance, through what I 
would suggest is precisely such a failed performance. Having moved to Baltimore, the 
8-year-old Douglass was supervised by Mrs Auld. She had never kept slaves and, 
ignorant of the master’s role, initially treated Douglass kindly as a fellow human 
(Douglass, 1893: 92; 1969: 144), even agreeing to teach him to read (Douglass, 
1893: 94; 1969: 145; 1995: 20). Douglass goes so far as to attribute all his future 
prosperity to his literacy, an achievement for which he thanks Mrs Auld and, 
ironically, her husband who upon discovering his wife’s actions forbad further 
instruction. Underestimating the young boy’s comprehension, he lectured his wife on 
the illegality and danger of her actions, affording Douglass a glimpse into the ‘hidden 
transcript’ of his masters: “Learning would spoil the best nigger in the world […] if 
you teach that nigger […] how to read, there would be no keeping him” (Douglass, 
1995: 20). Following this epiphany regarding the crucial role of illiteracy and 
ignorance in maintaining the slave system Douglass resolved, against the fervent 
opposition of master and mistress, to learn to read and write. Notwithstanding 
Douglass’s ingenuity in tricking or persuading other children to teach him letters and 
obtaining reading materials (Douglass, 1893: 101-102; 1969: 155-157; 1995: 23), 
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observing shipbuilders writing on ship parts and secreting himself in the kitchen loft 
with his master’s son’s copy books (Douglass, 1893: 115; 1969: 171-172; 1995: 25-
26), that this was possible at all reveals crucial spaces for resistance. This is in both 
metaphorical (the space produced by his mistress’s ‘failed’ performance, part of 
power relations) and literal senses of a space—the attic—under the masters’ noses yet 
outside their routine surveillance, where it was possible to hide. Harriet Jacobs hid for 
years in such a space (Jacobs, 2001), a ‘loophole’ that Burnham (2001: 285-287) 
connects to the imperfection of panoptic surveillance). 
 
Subsequent negative changes in Mrs Auld exemplify a recurrent theme in Douglass’s 
narratives about the detrimental effects of slavery upon masters as well as slaves, 
consistent with Foucault’s general position that relations of power are not simply 
relations between two unitary individuals, but are relations productive of 
subjectivities. 
 
Everyday Forms of Resistance 
Refusals, physical resistance and escape are only the most resistances. Such large-
scale states of domination as antebellum slavery afford “fairly extensive social 
existence outside the immediate control of the dominant” (Scott, 1990: xi). This 
space both offers opportunities for—and is created by—practices of everyday 
resistance. These manifold resistances, taken together constitute a disguised critique 
of power (Scott, 1990: xiii) that typically remains ‘off-stage’ as a ‘hidden transcript’ 
beneath ‘public’ performances, but occasionally bursts onto the main stage, as in the 
case of Douglass’s resistance to Covey (Scott, 1990: 208). Douglass’s account 
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exemplifies Scott’s analyses of pilfering (Scott, 1990: 188-189), careful control of 
work rates (Douglass, 1893: 184), and singing (Scott, 1990: 162). 
 
Slaves’ singing expressed their deepest sorrows (Douglass, 1893: 61-62; 1995: 8). 
Gilroy (1993) connects slaves’ music with the violence suffered: pain, despite its 
language-destroying capacity is nevertheless not unrepresentable (Gilroy, 1993 cited 
in Bakare-Yusuf, 1999: 315). The expressive splitting of language from sound comes 
forth strongly in Douglass’s moving discussion, and underlies the subversive double-
meanings of the songs. Whilst masters expected (and even required) slaves to sing 
and held it to be a sign of happiness, slave songs masked their meanings, connecting 
meaningless or happy words with sorrowful or angry music, or cheerful energetic 
music with deeply sorrowful words (Douglass, 1893: 61-62; 1995: 8) – a tactical 
indeterminacy in the protracted battle with masters (Gilroy, 1993: 74). Furthermore 
key words constituted a secret language, thus slaves singing of “Canaan” sang of the 
North and freedom in earshot of their masters (Douglass, 1969: 278-279). When 
slaves were alone, their songs would include “sharp hits” against slaveholders 
(Douglass, 1969: 252-253). Similarly, while separated from other plantations (see 
above), within a plantation, slaves would “execrate” and mock their masters 
(Douglass, 1969: 118; 1995: 12) and call them names, for example Covey was “the 
snake” (Douglass, 1893: 149; 1995: 36). In the case of one master Douglass reports 
he was “an inapt pupil” at learning to call him “Master”, something that evidently 
caused the master some anxiety and confusion, and Douglass some enjoyment 
(Douglass, 1969: 192-193). Thus, the outwardly respectful address, “Captain Auld”, 
was in fact a disrespectful contestation of status – a “sly civility” (see Bhabha, 1994b) 
a mimicry of servility that marks “moments of civil disobedience within the discipline 
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of civility” (Bhabha, 1985: 162, my emphasis), tapping into slaveholders’ anxieties 
and resisting/subverting the disciplinary structures of slavery. 
 
Slaves employed various strategies to combat starvation (sometimes at great risk – see 
above). Douglass recounts stealing food and begging (Douglass, 1893: 81; 
1969: 126, 189-191, 202; 1995: 9-10, 31) and justifies this by arguing that slavery 
renders it almost impossible for the slave to commit an immoral or criminal act, both 
since “freedom of choice is the essence of accountability” (Douglass, 1969: 191) and 
the slave only takes the fruits of his/her own labour. Douglass justifies not only theft 
from individual masters but from “society at large”, which had “bound itself, in form 
and fact, to assist […] in robbing me of my rightful liberty.” (Douglass, 1969: 191) 
Theft, then, is simultaneously survival and a critique of power – in Scott’s terms a 
‘hidden transcript’, now publicised by Douglass as itself an act of resistance in his 
narratives. 
 
Such practices affirm a realm of freedom into which masters cannot usually intrude. 
Scott discusses the cumulative impact of such myriad small resistances in terms of a 
hydraulic metaphor in which power ‘presses down’ producing ‘pressure’ from below 
that will eventually burst unless released (Scott, 1990: 186). Pursuing this metaphor, 
we may question whether ‘hidden transcripts’ and such spaces of resistance serve to 
dissipate such pressure, or to sustain and store it until an outburst of public critique or 
resistance (Scott, 1990: 177-180; 185-192). Whilst Scott clearly appreciates different 
resistances, is critical of this metaphor, and disavows any universalising theory (Scott, 
1990: xi) his discussion does not note—and appears to replicate—a problematic effect 
of this metaphor, homogenising resistances (plural) as resistance (singular), a move at 
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odds with the Foucauldian linkage of power and resistance. Since power varies, there 
is neither “resistance” nor any “soul of revolt” for Foucault, only “resistances” 
(Foucault, 1998: 95-96). These may coalesce but Foucault suggests an appropriate 
metaphor is that of networks or circuits of power interacting in complex fashion, 
hence irreducible to a hydraulic image. Even in the relatively static power relations of 
a state of domination such a metaphor still seems problematic in light of Foucault’s 
caution against a negative view of power as that which only represses (and thus, in its 
own interest, might ease off a little to ‘let off steam’). Scott (1990: 185) notes that 
Douglass himself employs this metaphor: Douglass’s analysis of the function of 
Christmas holidays indeed states “these holidays are conductors or safety-valves” 
(Douglass, 1969: 254, quoted in Scott, 1990: 185) however Scott disregards another 
more subtle suggestion in the same section, which reveals another function, positively 
productive of a specific subjectivity that has important consequences for 
understanding other aspects of Douglass’s resistance. 
 
Religion, Literacy and Self-Creation 
That neglected suggestion is that the holidays function to disgust the slave with 
freedom, i.e. to produce a subjectivity that finds “freedom” repulsive and is convinced 
“that there was little to choose between liberty and slavery” (Douglass, 1969: 255; 
1995: 45). At Christmas, masters encouraged slaves (betting and deeming refusal 
“disgraceful”) to drink to such excess that Douglass found himself “feeling, on the 
whole, rather glad to go, from what our master had deceived us into a belief was 
freedom, back to the arms of slavery.” (Douglass, 1969: 255; 1995: 45) To the 
masters, “sober, thinking” slaves were dangerous (Douglass, 1969: 256). This is part 
of that aspect of slavery that operates not by pure violence but through seeking to 
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encourage slaves to ‘make themselves’ in particular ways, and not in others. Though 
reinforced through violence, this ultimately requires that it be exercised on and in the 
slave himself: “To make a contented slave, you must make a thoughtless one. It is 
necessary to darken his moral and mental vision, […] to annihilate his power of 
reason […] It must not depend upon mere force; the slave must know no Higher Law 
than his master's will.” (Douglass, 1969: 320, my emphasis)  
 
Violence gained meaning through justificatory discourses (notably, pervasive racism 
and Christianity). Slaveholders found Biblical support for slavery, teaching slaves to 
accept their position as God’s will, and their masters as just. Douglass records with 
exasperation slaves who accepted and recirculated their masters’ biblical 
interpretation as justifying their enslavement and punishments (Douglass, 1969: 159), 
suggesting it was efficacious to persuade slaves to accept violence where possible, 
and crucial that they should know no other “Christianity”. Violence, then, was 
suffused with discourse – one small example of the importance of religion – however 
religious counter-discourses were crucial to slave resistance and central to outside 
abolitionist efforts. Whilst religion served to support slavery, it also exemplifies the 
“tactical polyvalence” of discourses (Foucault, 1998: 100). The Bible is equivocal on 
slavery – whilst some sections can be read as supporting it (e.g. Exodus 21:2-6; 
Exodus 21:20-21; Titus 2:9-10; 1 Timothy 6:1; Luke 12:46-48 (see Douglass, 
1995: 33)), others offer powerful resources for slaves to identify with. Slaves 
themselves seized upon Christianity, adapting it and interpreting it in light of their 
experiences: Douglass identifies with biblical Israel (Douglass, 1893: 264) – offering 
hope for emancipation in this life. Religion contributed to slaves’ critiques of their 
masters, perhaps suggesting justice to come in the next life: Douglass invokes God’s 
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righteous vengeance (Jeremiah 5:9 – see Douglass, 1995: 74), while “He can’t go to 
heaven with our blood in his skirts” was accepted slave wisdom (Douglass, 
1969: 195). It also offered chances to identify and ruthlessly mock the immense 
hypocrisy of slaveholding religion – a tactic employed in Douglass’s narratives to 
blistering effect. 
 
In addition to oral religion—a hidden transcript of slave meetings and discourse 
(Scott, 1990: 14)—religion was also closely tied to literacy. So important was slave 
illiteracy, teaching slaves to read was severely punished (Douglass, 1969: 432), while 
mobs of Christian class-leaders violently ended slaves’ attempts to read the Bible 
(Douglass, 1969: 200, 266). This might be understood simply in terms of “knowledge 
is power”, whereby one unitary subject knows more than another unitary subject who 
is thus tactically disadvantaged; hence the slave who learns gains capacity. However 
Foucault’s subtler connection of power-knowledge and subjectivity suggests we 
should look deeper. The power of slavery, insofar as it is relational, could not operate 
without producing corresponding knowledges and corresponding individuals. 
Combining this with Scarry’s notion of violence desubjectifying, part of the power of 
learning to read and interpret for oneself may be that it is a form of resistance that 
both directly challenges desubjectification – an act of self-creation amidst destruction 
– and enables production of counter-knowledges and contestation of a slave identity 
consisting only of a naturally low status. Douglass finds purpose, past and future in 
religion, in believing he can be a preacher (Douglass, 1969: 168-169), and in both 
learning to read and write and teaching others. He experiences himself as a capable 
subject, special, valuable to others (Douglass, 1969: 182), and unable to be bound 
forever. Convinced of the liberating power of literacy (and the practical necessity of 
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writing passes (a key technology of slave surveillance (Parenti, 2003: 15, 21)) for 
himself and other escapees to deflect their racial visibility), Douglass integrates his 
teaching/learning into a coherent narrative of self-identity, extended through time in a 
way that enables him to escape the present. Such self-creation—self-narration—is 
performative. The telos of his story-of-self is to be freedom-from-slavery but its 
enactment and continual self-recitation is a form of future-oriented freedom-within-
slavery. 
 
Douglass’s repeated involvement (despite location changes and mobs of indignant 
slaveholders) in Sabbath schools (Douglass, 1893: 136, 186; 1969: 199-201, 264-
268; 1995: 33, 48-49) was part of, and helped produce, a community of others 
engaged in such threatening practices. I am suggesting therefore that regardless of any 
increase in objective capacity, and regardless of the (undoubted) accuracy of 
Douglass’s analysis of the role of illiteracy, literacy was significant in the narration of 
a self-identity, a ‘full’ subjectivity. The inclusion of a notion of developing the self as 
a coherent ‘narration’ helps unite many resistances into a larger effect without 
resorting to a hydraulic metaphor or assuming the actual homogeneity or objective 
coherence of those resistances. This does not presume an independent teleological 
reality of necessarily progressing events: rather, it is my suggestion that the process of 
actively constructing such a narrative of self performatively effected self-identity 
against a system which functioned through the denial of self-identity and full 
subjecthood as attributes that could be located in a body marked as slave. 
Performativity implies neither ex nihilo creation nor that there is no internal psyche 
(Butler, 1999: xv)—indeed Butler accuses Foucault of neglecting the psyche’s 
subversive potential (Butler, 1997b: 3 cited in Salih, 2002: 120)—but suggests the 
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internality of the psyche, the materiality of the body, and power relations are not 
easily separable: the psyche forms (imperfectly) in response power, but power has a 
psychic ‘life’ hence is vulnerable (see Butler, 1997b). 
 
Douglass’s formation of an ‘internal’ self was powerfully resistant and subversive, yet 
its form and formation depended on gaps in the situation, failures in the performance 
of the dominant (particularly in his mistress beginning to teach him to read) and 
spaces (literal and figurative) in which he could develop. As such, although a 
Herculean achievement, it is not pure transcendence of power and violence, but the 
wilful uptake of power to escape violence and improve the bearability of power 
relations.  
 
Admittedly, both my considering the ‘author’ (Douglass) with the apparently 
concomitant ‘embrace’ of identity, and Butler’s partial acceptance of an internal 
realm are moves of which Foucault may have been suspicious given his critique of the 
notion of the author (Foucault, 1977c; 1988: 14 cited Mills 2003: 3; Dumm, 
1996: xxi-xxiii) and preference for ‘surface’ rather than ‘depth’ (Prozorov, 2007: 37). 
I would stress I am not positing identity, depth or authorial consistency as natural 
attributes, rather suggesting that in these circumstances of power and violence it was 
resistant to produce and hold on to these effects. Foucault’s critique of ‘the author’ 
and suspicion of ‘identity’ should be understood in the context of a political project 
concerned with identifying how our subjectification traps us, in the context of 
government through the production of subjectivity and the ascription of identity. It 
may be that in a state of domination where bodies are enslaved by the destruction of 
subjectivity and denial of identity (perhaps more accurately by restricting ‘their’ 
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identity to a minimal category, “slave”, but denying self-identity), embracing identity 
and subjectification may, on balance, be substantively liberating: the ‘traps’ of 
identity may be preferable to, and peculiarly able to loosen, the bodily trap of slavery. 
 
Violence/Power, Desubjectification/Subjectification 
 
Based on Douglass’s account, this chapter has argued that violence—in both the 
everyday sense of physical attack, and the Foucauldian sense of (at least temporarily) 
non-resistible coercion—are central to slavery. However, the analysis of master-slave 
relations and the presence of so many resistances suggest power at work also. 
 
Much of what Douglass describes – masters attempting to persuade and deceive 
slaves, disciplinary surveillance, spectacular violence to produce terror in others 
besides the victim – requires the uptake of the relation by the slave, or operates by 
enlisting the slave in his/her own subjection, hence qualifies as power. As Foucault 
suggests regarding discipline, this may come down to ‘economy’: these mechanisms 
were less ‘costly’ (in terms of intensity/frequency of application versus the potential 
for failure) than other more purely violent mechanisms. Fewer, sometimes absent, 
masters could control more slaves - certainly that is one implication of Douglass’s 
analysis of Covey (Douglass, 1995: 36). Slavery functioned in large part through the 
continual presence of the slave driver, but for preventing escape or ensuring the 
efficient running of certain aspects of the system this would be uneconomical. The 
productive mixing of relationships of violence with relations of power enables the 
effects of violence to be extended through time, seeking to ensure slaves ‘drive’ 
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themselves, and perpetuating the relative fixity of the “state of domination”, rendering 
resistance difficult but also producing possibilities to the extent that power operated.  
 
Employing power potentially improves masters’ self-image and social standing: 
happy slaves signify the master’s quality as patriarch and function to enable the 
disqualification as abnormal of resistant slaves (Tynes Cowan, 2005: 22). Douglass 
notes many related examples: the importance of visitors seeing the well-fed, well-
dressed slaves at the Great House (Douglass, 1893: 68); the (disciplined) reports of 
slaves to outsiders that their masters are kind (Douglass, 1995: 11); slaves’ songs 
interpreted as signs of happiness (Douglass, 1995: 9); and the vilification of resistant 
slaves as abnormal (Douglass, 1893: 179; 1969: 250). 
 
These are suggested logics as to why power may be useful and slavery was not only 
violence, not claims that such requirements caused those relations (furthermore, 
strategies are internal to power and distinct from purposes (Dean, 1999: 22)). Such a 
causal claim would sit uneasily with Foucault’s understanding of history (see 
Foucault, 1977b) and archaeological and genealogical methods, which have in any 
case not been employed here. It would require considerably more and different 
research to write a history of these practices, rather than interpreting a snapshot.  
 
The suggestion then, based on Douglass’s snapshot, is that this “state of domination” 
has violence at is core, as its condition of possibility, but while horrendous it was 
neither boundless nor limitless. Violence produced a domain in which relations of 
power then come in to play, with the permanent threat of and continuing periods of 
strategic recourse to violence (such as whipping or sending to the negro-breaker). 
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However, the power involved, in discipline for example, is not merely an alternative 
to violence: it also serves to segregate and thus reinforce the space in which 
‘sovereign’ violence is possible.  
 
I have also argued that violence and power both work through individual bodies, in 
distinct ways. However, is there a contradiction suggesting power operates by 
producing specific subjectivities—subjectification—while violence operates by 
desubjectification? Does this not imply power and violence counteract one-another? 
This is not necessarily the case, though gaps in power can enable escape from 
violence. Generally, one could suggest these are processes operating at different 
times, such that (put very simply) desubjectification ‘clears a space’ for the 
production of other docile subjectivities, though this seems perhaps suspiciously neat. 
The ‘need’ to separate these two processes in time in order that they do not contradict 
one-another perhaps flows from an assumption that there either is or isn’t a subject, 
that the subject is a fact and not an effect. If as Foucault suggested the subject is a 
form, there may not be one subject, but multiple processes of formation and 
deformation. Bakare-Yusuf (1999: 315) argues the “(near) impossibility of 
constituting pain in language initiates a splitting, a splitting between the speaking 
subject (voice) and corporeal subject (body)”. Perhaps it is this dissociation that is 
crucial, such that a minimal, docile, speaking subject may be constituted in 
accordance with slavery’s needs while the body is appropriated. This would make 
sense in light of Douglass’s experience of ‘resurrection’: describing his first six 
months with Covey Douglass’s body reads as a collection of pained parts, the source 
of vulnerability, or as his commonality with animals similarly to be broken (Douglass, 
1969: 213). After his fight, he rediscovers his body not as the locus of pain but as the 
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source of freedom and protection. Here his tone changes: he speaks of himself with 
plans and confidence, as strong rather than vulnerable. This reconnection with his 
body grounds his subsequent determination to be free and his belief that he can and 
will be. The project of self-development begun in Baltimore is restarted: from this 
point he consciously plans escape (Douglass, 1969: 273-274), soon restarts his 
teaching (Douglass, 1969: 264-268), and measures himself against past and future, 
determining not to let a year pass without attempting escape (Douglass, 1969: 274). 
Chapter 3 extends this notion of self-creation-as-resistance, suggesting Douglass’s 
narratives themselves be considered in performative terms, as extending his resistance 
beyond his own period in slavery, as part of a substantial shift in national 
understanding of self and slavery. 
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3 
 
 
Narrative as Resistance, Nation as Narration 
 
 
The previous chapter considered Douglass’s narratives as a source of empirical 
information on slavery, outlining some implications of and for Foucauldian 
understandings of power, violence and resistance. This chapter seeks to consider his 
autobiographical narratives themselves as performative resistance, and note some 
limits on Douglass’s subversiveness. Towards the end of chapter 2, I argued that self-
creation was key to Douglass’s resistance to the desubjectifying effects of violence 
and the ascription of limited ‘slave’ identity, suggesting this self-creation was a 
sequence of performative acts, a narrative of self whereby repetitious narration of self 
produces the temporally extended effect of self.  
 
To clarify and extend this, I first want to outline performativity further, as a response 
to an apparent problem with Foucault’s understanding of subjects and power: if the 
subject is an effect of power relations, if resistance is always implicated in power and 
vice-versa, if there can be no final escape from power, what meaning can agency 
have? Space precludes extended discussion of ontology or other responses, which 
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would include Prozorov (2007)’s discussion of ‘concrete freedom’. Prozorov’s 
dismissal of subversive, mocking or identity-proliferatory tactics (Prozorov, 
2007: 60, 65) in favour of ‘indifference’ (Prozorov, 2007: 69-77) or refusal of 
biopolitical care (Prozorov, 2007: 111) appears less helpful here than performativity, 
as used by Butler (1993; 1997a; 1999), and used by Bhabha (1994a) in relation to the 
idea of ‘nation’ as narration.  
 
Butler’s theory connects the persistent appearance and apparent persistence of 
‘essence’, identity and subject with Foucault’s insight that power constructs such 
objects, while simultaneously elucidating the possibilities and ontological nature of 
agency. ‘Performativity’ refers to a capacity of speech to either cause action 
(perlocution) or to actually enact (illocution) (Butler, 1997a: 3, 44; Austin, 1998). 
Butler draws on an illocutionary logic to suggest that which appears to be expressed 
timeless essence is actually the retroactively installed ‘hallucinatory effect’ of 
repetitious future-directed performances that produce that reality which they 
anticipate (Butler, 1999: xv) by ‘citing’ it. Such ‘citation’ simultaneously offers 
possibilities for repeating/re-citing differently – indeed, citation is necessarily 
‘imperfect’ with respect to any speaker’s intentions or even those regularities that 
might in Foucauldian terms be attributed to impersonal discourses: utterance calls 
forth a “condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past and future directions” (Butler, 
1997a: 3, my emphasis). ‘Agency’ is thereby rethought as utilising power’s 
simultaneous need for citation and consequent vulnerability. This can not only change 
the resultant ‘essence’, but may subvert the effect of essentiality itself, as in Butler’s 
example of ‘drag’ (Butler, 1999: 174-180) in which ‘doing gender wrong’ reveals the 
iterability and artifice of all gender. Voluntarism of a prior subject is not implied 
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(Butler, 1993: 3, 13, 94; 1999: xv), and ‘agency’ still operates within social 
constraints: Butler talks of subjects interpellated by ‘the law’, forcibly citing specific 
regulatory norms, however she also suggests that ‘law’ itself exists in action/citation 
and hence while compulsory is not absolutely determining or fixed (Butler, 1993: 14, 
108, 231-232). The subject does not stand apart from and prior to its citational acts, 
rather the intelligible subject is the effect of performance. It is at any given moment 
both the constrained effect of prior citations and that which may be different in future 
and must, in any case, continue to be repeatedly performed; It is this temporal aspect 
that suggests something of the power of narrative to revalue the past, but it requires a 
turn to Bhabha to theorise that aspect more fully (see below). 
 
Butler’s theory also displays a certain homology with Bhabha (acknowledged by 
Butler, 1999: 192 footnote 11), whose notion of hybridity similarly denies the 
existence of pure or prior identities or essences. Hybridity is not a mixture of prior 
elements (a dialectical third term), but the ‘original mixedness’ of all identity 
(Huddart, 2006: 6-7) and the “third space” (Bhabha, 1998: 211, my emphasis) from 
which ‘elements’ are made to appear. As an ontological assertion, hybridity provides 
a space for agency (based on iterability and the repressed Other) similar to that 
identified by Butler, even in extreme domination. However its potential is not 
necessarily fulfilled: ‘articulation’ is required for any effect (Norval, 1999a: 100; 
1999b: 93). Noting the duality of contingent ‘linking’ and ‘speaking’ implied by 
‘articulation’ (Hall, 1996: 141) I would suggest that it is precisely through the 
continued ‘speaking’ as performative (illocutionary) utterance that the linking of 
elements of ‘identity’ (more accurately, elements of hybridities) is iteratively 
maintained (or subverted) in time. 
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I have suggested that for Douglass, the performative production of a self, of a capable 
subjectivity and a coherent narrative of identity, was an important act of resistance 
precisely insofar as he found himself in a state of domination that functioned on the 
twin bases of desubjectification (through violence) and constructing (through/as 
power) specific minimal, docile, subjectivities. Slaves, then, were denied what 
Bhabha calls the ‘right to narrate’ (Huddart, 2006: 92-94) and status as fully human 
subjects (both as a discursive operation—for example through religious constructions 
of slaves as cursed—and (inseparably) as an effect of power and violence). 
 
Douglass’s Narratives can be seen as a forceful taking-up of the subject position 
denied him under slavery, performatively—illocutionarily—producing the effect of a 
subject in a body that ‘should’ not coincide with it – ‘should’ be a mere object. 
Through their increasingly self-reflective tone (Allen, 2008), the narratives 
repeatedly, almost compulsively, enact self-(re)creation – perpetuating and reiterating 
the process throughout his life and simultaneously inviting (perlocution) readers to 
join his excoriation of, and revulsion at slavery which is logically near-inseparable 
from accepting him—a slave—as a fellow articulate subject, and acknowledging his 
‘right to narrate’.  
 
Douglass’s own articulation is formidable, both in terms of his narrative and 
argumentative skill and in terms of the ‘elements’ he manages to articulate against the 
expectations and machinations of slavery. Here is an ‘articulate’ man, undeniably 
commanding intellectual respect, demonstrating uncommon literary and analytical 
skill in weaving his own story with the religious and humanitarian discourses of 
abolitionism. Yet the man doing this (Douglass was not unique in this, but was 
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especially prominent) is a black man and a slave – more commonly denied even the 
status ‘man’. Whilst in slavery, as was his design, literacy ‘unfitted’ him for slavery 
(Douglass, 1893: 97, 179-180; 1969: 146; 1995: 20). After his escape, such was the 
discursive environment that it was widely suggested that one so articulate could not 
have been a slave (Douglass, 1893: 269-270; 1969: 361-363; 1995: iii). His 1845 
Narrative (Douglass, 1995) was expressly published to refute such suggestions. For a 
predominantly white audience (simply because so few slaves could access or read it – 
Allen, 2008), this contributed to wider destabilisations of the association of 
‘black’/‘slave’ with ‘illiterate’/‘inarticulate’/‘passive object’, instead articulating 
‘black man’/‘slave’ to a powerfully dignified image of human/intellectual 
capacity/refinement/‘articulate subject’ through and with a discourse that contested 
slaveholders’ religious interpretations. As should be clear from the linkage of 
articulation with hybridity above, these signs—“black man”, “slave”, etc.—are not 
elemental blocks whose rearticulation relocates them whole, rather articulation 
(Norval 1999a: 111) and relocation/recitation alter them. While Douglass may not 
have theorised in such terms, he was clearly aware of the effect of his writing and the 
subversive effect of his mere presence at state functions, in challenging both white 
views and those of other black people, some of whom questioned his place (Douglass, 
1893: 445). 
 
These performative effects may have changed the content-effect of, for example, 
“black man” but they did not necessarily subvert the very distinctions black/white, 
man/woman or their epistemological grounds. While Douglass’s efforts against racist 
prejudice cannot be doubted, on occasions he himself appears to operate within a 
discourse of ‘natural’ racial attributes. Whilst he fights the devaluation of ‘the black 
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man’ he replicates the epistemological and ontological assumptions of the ‘scientific’ 
discourse of racism that would identify such an object of knowledge as ‘the black 
man’ in the first place (though he may at times be pandering to his audience’s 
prejudices in order to subvert them). Consider this quotation: “The black man (unlike 
the Indian) loves civilisation. He does not make very great progress in civilisation 
himself, but he likes to be in the midst of it” (Douglass, 1893: 355). This would 
appear to repeat the view (so ably countered by Douglass’s own acts) of the passive 
black man, who (as white racist discourse would hold) apparently needs civilisation to 
be brought in from outside. It also constructs “the black man” and “the Indian” as 
natural, essential identities. The comment on “the Indian”—no doubt 
unintentionally—is complicit in a discourse enabling domination, destruction and 
devaluation of native-American cultures as irretrievably savage natures. Douglass 
disputes the specific content of racial nature and clearly sees the importance and 
power of such content, but (unsurprisingly given his time and place) cannot see (as 
Foucault would argue) that ‘naturalness’ is itself an effect of power. Furthermore, 
Douglass has been accused of sexism: whilst he was, for his time and place and in his 
own words, “a woman’s rights man”, this may have been second to Black men’s 
rights (hooks, 1982: 33-34, 89-91), though hooks perhaps undervalues his various 
statements to the contrary, indeed the masthead of Douglass’s newspaper North Star 
places sex before race: “RIGHT IS OF NO SEX—TRUTH IS OF NO COLOUR” 
(Douglass, 1848). While he speaks extremely positively (and not condescendingly) 
about many women – in slavery, in abolitionism, on his trips abroad – Douglass 
frequently (38 instances in his autobiographies) adopts rhetorical strategies of 
excoriating unmanly slaveholders or lauding manly statesmen, subtly (however 
unintentionally) reinforcing a male/female public/private divide. Whilst Douglass 
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went remarkably far in his feminism and anti-racism, these aspects of Douglass 
highlight Foucault’s points that liberation struggles are incomplete (Foucault, 
2000b: 282-283) and we cannot escape power or discourse entirely. 
 
There is perhaps room for more optimistic readings: Douglass demonstrates a concern 
with questioning such received wisdom and demanding it be proven or abandoned, at 
least when aware of it. Furthermore, his assertions that, for example, the relation of 
slavery makes masters indolent or violent, unhappy and dishonest (Douglass, 
1893: 51, 93, 100-101; 1969: 105, 111-112, 142-145, 152-154, 161-162, 183; 
1995: 22, 30), and that his former master, Thomas Auld (whom he once considered 
among the worst) was “a victim of the circumstances of birth, education, law, and 
custom” (Douglass, 1893: 535) suggest produced subjectivities, undermining any 
hierarchical and essentialist views. Perhaps the performative effects of his utterances 
exceeded themselves and him, undermining hierarchy and essentialist understandings 
regarding which his own stated views were either supportive or ambivalent. 
 
We have seen that Douglass’s narratives were a continuation of his self-creation and 
resistance to slavery beyond his actual escape from slavery, and were important for 
what they did as well as said. As suggested by these performative effects, Douglass’s 
‘resistance’ had repercussions far beyond his own personal life and the local power 
relations in which he found/made himself once liberated. His increasing prominence 
(infamy and fame), connections (with abolitionism in general, and with countless 
individuals lectured and spoken to, including Abraham Lincoln himself (Douglass, 
1893: 421-425)), his best-selling autobiographies and political career in the state are 
indissociable from broader trends of discourse and power relations they helped 
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produce. Douglass’s life, narratives and the political career they recount can be read 
as part of a contingent process of effecting a change in national identity that goes far 
beyond one man escaping slavery, or even all slaves escaping slavery, to a struggle 
over the meaning and significance of race, and a nation struggling over the rejection 
and revaluation of slavery in the context of its historical national identity.  
 
Beyond Foucault’s general point that power relations extend throughout society, from 
local performances upward, how might we theorise larger scales of politics such as 
national identity as embedded in discourse and smaller shifts in power? My purpose 
here is distinct from Weber’s suggestion that the state is an effect of performative 
practices (Weber, 1998: 78), concerning rather how the nation as an imagined 
community (Anderson, 1983 cited in Bhabha, 1994a: 149) may be similarly 
conceived. To do so necessitates first outlining Bhabha’s ideas on how a ‘nation’ 
exists through and in time, and by producing a national ‘time’ of history. 
 
Bhabha’s essay DissemiNation discusses the idea of ‘nation’ as ‘narration’ using the 
twin concepts of the performative and the pedagogical, and associated forms of 
‘time’. Bhabha’s sparse formulation describes “the continuist, accumulative 
temporality of the pedagogical” ambivalently in tension with “the repetitious, 
recursive strategy of the performative” (Bhabha, 1994a: 145). The nation exists as a 
story told with authority (the pedagogical) and repeatedly cited (the performative). In 
constructing an image of a history the authorized and authorizing nationalist 
pedagogy posits time as a continuous building up of a national history – a coherent 
sequence of events whose principal character is the nation—the people—that 
undergoes them together and who are posited as sharing an origin (Bhabha, 
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1994a: 144-145). However, performativity would suggest that such an actor—the 
nation—is not the source of history but an effect of citational historiography. 
Certainly, for Bhabha, the pedagogical must be cited: the nation must be made to live. 
“[T]o demonstrate the prodigious, living principles of the people as contemporaneity” 
is a process that must erase that which precedes. Hence, the ambivalence – the 
performative may be seen as the necessary repetition for the ‘nation’ to ‘be’ or its 
perpetual ‘becoming’ but also as the condition of possibility for its change. The 
pedagogical cannot do without the performative, but the performative perpetually 
threatens to transgress the pedagogical. Douglass starts on those very excluded 
margins upon which Bhabha suggests the pedagogical is fixated: as a fugitive slave he 
is part of what Bhabha describes as the “transgressive, invasive structure of the black 
‘national’ text” (Bhabha, 1994a: 144) engaged in a tactical guerilla warfare that 
Bhabha situates in Foucault’s suggestion that warfare continues beneath and through 
politics (see Foucault, 2004: 15-16). Douglass continued to be courageously involved 
in the Underground Railroad, and speaks with admiration of figures who were vilified 
in their time, such as John Brown, and who fought—literally—against slavery and 
against the nation-state’s support for it. Yet whilst he was consigned to the margins, 
his was not only an attempt to create a space for those he referred to (Douglass, 
1893: 277, 367, 458) as “his people” (i.e. the slave and free coloured population of 
the United States). His attempt was not only part of performative subversion, nor was 
he anti-nationalist. It was also an attempt to ‘occupy’, contest and change nationalist 
pedagogy – not to contest the idea of a nationalist pedagogy or of America, rather its 
specific content – a contestation over the future “past” attributed to the American 
nation, that it should be a nation that looked back with revulsion on a shameful 
history of slavery. This role, through campaigning and his written works, in 
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contributing to the change in historical perception and national self-understanding is 
perhaps the apogee of Douglass’s ‘resistance’ to slavery, pursued to the point where 
his position and influence is such that one wonders whether this ‘resistance’ is now 
better called ‘power’? Of course, Foucault’s point is that power and resistance are 
given at once; they are differentiated by their relational positions rather than by a 
difference in kind. This can be seen as an instance of a substantial reversal in power 
relations, such that the once-dominant slaveholders found themselves on the 
defensive. This is not to suggest a total change – the legacies of an incomplete 
emancipation persist today (Bales, 2004: 7) and Douglass was amongst the first to 
decry its inadequacies and campaign for improvement. Nor is it an escape from all 
power, or from nationalism – his freedom is not total, nor is his transgression: as with 
my earlier comments on Douglass’s incomplete escape from racism and sexism, he 
did not seek to contest the ontological or epistemological presumptions of a 
nationalist pedagogy (for example the idea of national identity and history), rather to 
reinterpret the specific evaluation of that history – nonetheless I hope I have shown 
that his performative ‘uptake’ of the situation that life offered him was substantively 
important, not merely resistance doomed by its association with power, and 
demonstrates such theories can help identify and theorise change. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
This dissertation has explored Foucault’s distinction between ‘power’ and ‘violence’ 
through a study of slavery, and studied slavery using Foucauldian concepts. I have 
argued the characterisation of slavery as pure coercion is inadequate, and that 
Foucault’s rhetorical use of slavery as exemplary of “violence” is at best problematic. 
Despite the difficulty of empirically separating ‘violence’ and ‘power’ or 
characterising a situation as one or the other, their analytical separation enables an 
understanding of different, albeit simultaneous, processes. 
 
There is a strong case for understanding aspects of slavery through the lens of ‘power’ 
as well as ‘violence’, at least in the case of Douglass’s antebellum experience. 
Foucault’s analysis of sovereignty proved instructive for understanding killing, torture 
and certain possibilities of resistance on the plantation, informing the argument 
throughout that there is a duality of power/violence in what can be considered a state 
of domination: violence where present is simultaneously part of power relations (for 
example, violence between master-murderer and slave-victim is power between 
master and other slaves. Understanding ‘violence’ aspects required a turn to Scarry’s 
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theory of desubjectification, which although potentially in tension with Foucault, 
suggested violent desubjectification can operate alongside specific forms of 
subjectification. 
 
The analysis of disciplinary surveillance raised the suggestion that Foucault’s thesis 
of the shift from sovereignty to discipline was, at best, inadequately qualified with 
respect to the USA at this time (Foucault does note (but not specify) irregularities of 
the transformation (Foucault, 1977a: 15)). Surveillance was important in slavery but 
was decoupled from other aspects of discipline—dressage, segmentation of time, 
ranking, measuring and augmentation of capabilities, the changed political anatomy 
of body and ‘gentle’ punishment—which generally did not apply to the slave 
population. The dissertation has, in general, raised more questions than it has 
answered, including those regarding the possible functions of this extra-disciplinary 
sovereign space: the intriguing notion of the slavery as heterotopia appears just as 
relevant to today’s understanding of freedom – as such I intend to consider this 
further in future. Much remains to investigate – for example, I have not dealt 
extensively with gender or race: my only defences are those of limited space and 
correspondingly limited goals and conclusions, and that my forthcoming PhD will 
seek to integrate such concerns. 
 
Douglass’s experiences cannot be presumed to be replicated in present day slavery, 
though there is still no a priori reason to discount power: again it will be necessary to 
seek evidence of resistance(s), and ask similar questions about the relationships of 
power, violence, and subjects. Certain of the phenomena identified (for example, 
spectacular killing or surveillance) suggest broader relevance, as their mechanics do 
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not necessarily presuppose ownership or racial difference. However, that Douglass’s 
specific resistances and escape resulted from a number of historically specific aspects. 
Slaveholders’ attempts to justify slavery and operate through discourse and tactics 
characterizable as power enabled resistances that undermined those justifications 
(whereas Bales (2004: 10) suggests today’s slaveholders feel no need for justification 
and employ violence). Slavery’s legality also made it possible for slaves to not be 
completely “in chains”, thus not fitting Foucault’s metaphor: since slavery was legal, 
masters could risk slaves moving about in the open (taking into account the 
disciplinary effects that produced a separation between plantations and between 
slaves and outsiders). Without these mechanisms, and without legality, it is likely that 
slaves’ mobility will be even more curtailed: they may have no equivalent of the few 
‘leisure’ hours (Douglass, 1893: 115; 1969: 182) Douglass had in which to foster his 
literacy and recover from violent desubjectification. They may also have less access 
to even the limited knowledge of freedom that Douglass was able to glean from 
people other than his immediate masters. In the absence of legality it is likely that 
more violence, in Foucault’s sense, may be employed, in which case the potential for 
resistance and escape for today’s post-abolition slaves may be diminished. 
Nonetheless—perhaps even more so—the need for a study of resistance among 
contemporary slaves, that does not presume total helplessness from the outset, 
remains acute. 
 
Chapter 2 noted the problem of homogenising resistances with a hydraulic metaphor, 
but suggested an alternative, emphasizing the importance of performative 
construction of a self in response to both desubjectification and construction of 
dehumanized minimal identity. As this understanding is based not on Douglass 
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individually but on a model of power, subjectivity and identity as iterative and 
violence as desubjectifying it is likely this will have broader applicability, however it 
is particularly pronounced in Douglass’s case, which may well have led me to 
overemphasize its importance. There is insufficient evidence to comment further, but 
the interaction of power and self underlies my research interests so this is something 
for future investigation. It is also unexplored in this dissertation how exactly those 
processes fit into abolitionist discourse in general. Chapter 3’s discussion of narrating 
the nation touched on this, but perhaps raised more questions than it could answer – 
for example saying nothing about how or why this was successful, or how important it 
was. This has been an interpretive rather than a quantifiable finding, which would 
require far more research to stand with confidence. Both this and the heterotopia 
questions would perhaps be best dealt with in historical, or more accurately 
genealogical, fashion, reading these processes alongside other processes of national 
imagination and changes in punishment of ‘freemen’ respectively. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that in using Foucault’s concepts I should find myself limited by not 
employing his methods, but these simply were not feasible for this project. 
 
Chapter 3 also suggested Foucault’s understanding of discourse and incomplete 
liberation struggles helps appreciate some limitations of Douglass’s freedom from 
dominant discourses, though it was in fact remarkable how far he did go given his 
discursive and historical situation. It surely demonstrated too, pace his critics, that 
Foucault’s ideas need not subdue resistance, that they can help theorise resistances 
great and small. Chapter 3 moved away from Foucault himself, but used theories that 
remain dependent upon—and extend—Foucauldian views of power and subjectivity, 
while clarifying some possibilities for reversals of power relations, albeit in an 
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unusual case.  It is perhaps precisely the opportunity to move beyond his thought that 
attracts me to Foucault’s ideas. In the spirit of his ‘toolbox’ for users rather than 
devotees, whilst this dissertation has not been particularly ‘faithfully’ Foucauldian, I 
hope the reader will feel my rummaging in that toolbox has been fruitful, or has at 
least demonstrated that the tools have potential, for I intend to continue ‘rummaging’. 
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